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Attribution and the Umbrella Clause – Is there a 
Way out of the Deadlock? 
Dr. Michael Feit, LL.M.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Foreign investors frequently contract with entities entrusted with a 
role previously fulfilled by the host state.1 This is particularly true of 
utility and infrastructure industries, such as the production and 
distribution of energy (hydroelectric power, oil, gas, and coal), posts and 
telecommunications, transportation (railway, airports, and airlines), and 
financial services.2 While these entities are typically state-owned or 
otherwise closely affiliated with the state, they often possess a separate 
legal personality.3 For ease of reference, these entities will be referred to 
as “state-owned entities” (SOE). 
If an investor believes that a SOE is not complying with its 
contractual obligations, then the investor may bring a claim against the 
host state under the applicable bilateral or multilateral investment treaty 
 
*Dr. Michael Feit is an associate with Walder Wyss (Zurich) and specializes in 
international arbitration and litigation. Prior to joining the firm, Dr. Feit was a senior 
associate in the international arbitration practice group of a major law firm in London. Dr. 
Michael Feit graduated from the University of Zurich both as licentiatus iuris (magna cum 
laude; J.D. equivalent) and doctor iuris (summa cum laude; received award for outstanding 
performances in business law) and from New York University School of Law (LLM; 
Dean’s Graduate Award Scholar). Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the 
views of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Walder Wyss. 
 1. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 198 (2008); Paul Michael Blyschak, Arbitrating Overseas Oil and Gas 
Disputes: Breaches of Contract Versus Breaches of Treaty, 27 J. INT’L ARB. 579, 610, 618 
(2010); Barton Legum, Are States Liable for the Conduct of Their Instrumentalities?: Case 
Law of Tribunals Other Than ICC and ICSID, in STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 57, 63 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Jennifer Younan eds., 2008); Srilal M. 
Perera, State Responsibility—Ascertaining the Liability of States in Foreign Investment 
Disputes, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 499, 500 (2005); Thomas W. Wälde, Energy 
Charter Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration: Controversial Issues, 5 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 373, 396 (2004).   
 2. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 34 (2005); OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 9 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Wälde, supra note 1, at 396. 
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invoking, inter alia, the breach of the so-called “umbrella clause”.4 The 
umbrella clause is a regular feature of investment treaties and calls for 
host states to observe contractual obligations entered into by SOEs.5 For 
this type of claim to be successful two preconditions must be met.6 First, 
 
 4. See, e.g., Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 
¶ 68 (Oct. 12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf; DOLZER & SCHREUER, 
supra note 1, at 161 et seq. (2008); Blyschak, supra note 1, at 591–92, 596; Kaj Hobér, 
State Responsibility and Attribution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 575 et seq. (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
 5. For a typical version of a contemporary umbrella clause, see Energy Charter 
Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, 109 (“Each Contracting Party shall 
observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor 
of any other Contracting Party.”). See generally OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella 
Clause in Investment Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: 
UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 101–34 (2008).  
               6.    See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 
Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc A/RES/56/83 [hereinafter Articles of Responsibility] (Dec. 12, 
2001) which reads: “There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission: (a) [i]s attributable to the State under international 
law; and (b) [c]onstitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.” See also 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 68, U.N. Doc A/56/10 (2001), reprinted  in Rep. of the Int’l 
Law Comm’n, 53d sess, Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) 
[hereinafter Draft Articles] (“Article 2 specifies the conditions required to establish the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act of the State, i.e. the constituent elements of 
such an act. Two elements are identified. First, the conduct in question must be attributable 
to the State under international law. Secondly, for responsibility to attach to the act of the 
State, the conduct must constitute a breach of an international legal obligation in force for 
that State at that  time.”); see also, EDF (Serv.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/13, Award, ¶¶ 213–14 (Oct. 8, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/documents/EDFAwardandDissent.pdf (“In the Tribunal’s view, such 
conduct, including the subsequent bringing to an end of the contract arrangements and the 
institution of a system of auctions in their place, was clearly designed to achieve a 
particular result within the meaning of the Commentary to Article 8 of the ILC Articles. 
As such, this conduct was attributable to Romania. The question, remains whether the acts 
and conduct that, according to the Tribunal’s determination were attributable to Romania, 
were in violation of the BIT, as alleged by Claimant. Claimant has summarized as follows 
the BIT breaches it alleges were committed by Romania: ‘. . . The BIT between Romania 
and the UK contains . . . Romania’s obligation to observe its contractual agreements . . . 
.These alleged breaches will be examined in turn.’”) (quoting Reply for Complainant, ¶ 
377); Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶ 318 (Aug. 18, 2008), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showD
oc&docId=DC1611_En&caseId=C44. Regarding the preconditions of a state’s 
responsibility for the conduct of its instrumentalities, see generally Peter Tomka, Are 
States Liable for the Conduct of Their Instrumentalities?—Introductory Remarks, in 
STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 8–9 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Jennifer 
Younan eds., 2008). Even though addressing violations of international law other than 
breach of the umbrella clause, a diligent discussion of attribution can be found in Bayindir 
Insaat Turizm Ticaret VE Sanay A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 113 (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf.  
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the breach of contract must be attributable to the state.7 Second, the 
breach of contract must amount to a violation of the umbrella clause.8 
Tribunals apply different legal standards to both requirements causing the 
same case to be decided differently depending on the constitution of the 
tribunal.9  As one commentator correctly notes, “[i]nvestors looking for 
consistency in pursuing claims and states contemplating new BITs have 
been placed in a quandary.”10 
This article deals with the hotly debated first precondition of the 
state’s responsibility under the umbrella clause. Tribunals are split over 
the question of whether or not a breach of contract can be attributed to 
the state by applying the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles).11 When this question is 
answered is answered in the affirmative tribunals move on to decide 
whether the respective breach amounts to a violation of the umbrella 
clause.12 When, however, the question is answered in the negative, no 
further analysis is typically conducted because the state cannot be held 
responsible for conduct that cannot be attributed to it.13 
 
       7.  See Articles of Responsibility, supra note 6, Annex, art. 2; see also EDF, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/13, ¶ 213; Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, ¶ 68; Nykomb 
Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia, Case No. 118/2003, Award, § 4.2 (Arb. Inst. of 
the Stockholm Comm. 2003), http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Investor-
State_Disputes/Nykomb.pdf; Nick Gallus, An Umbrella Just for Two? BIT Obligations 
Observance Clauses and the Parties to a Contract, 24 ARB. INT’L 157, 165 (2008). 
 8. See, Articles of Responsibility, supra note 6, Annex, art. 2; see also EDF, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/13, ¶ 213; Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, ¶ 68; Nykomb, 
Case No. 118/2003, § 4.3; Gallus, supra note 7, at 165. 
 9. For a recent overview of the divergent constructions of the umbrella clause by 
ICSID tribunals, see Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 1005 (2011); see also Duke Energy, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, ¶ 319–20; 
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION—A COMMENTARY 236 (2d ed. 
2009) (“The exact meaning and effect of umbrella clauses has been the subject of much 
debate and disagreement in arbitral practice.”). 
 10. Potts, supra note 9, at 1030–31. 
 11. See Blyschak, supra note 1, at 611 (“To what degree this is possible, and under 
what circumstances, is a very uncertain area of law. Investment arbitration tribunal’s 
decisions on this point conflict, as do academic commentaries.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Gustav F.W. Hamester GmbH & Co. KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 313 (June 18, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf (“Naturally, if an act is 
considered attributable to the State, the Tribunal must then determine whether such an act 
is illegal and entails the international responsibility of the State . . . . If the Tribunal finds 
that an act is not attributable to the State, this should be the end of the matter.”); see also 
EDF, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, ¶¶ 213–14; Nykomb, Case No. 118/2003, ¶¶ 4.2–4.3. 
 13. See AMTO LLC v. Ukraine, Case No. 080/2005 (ECT), Final Award, ¶¶ 101, 
107–8, 110 (Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm Comm. 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/AmtoAward.pdf (holding that the conduct of the state-
owned entity could not be attributed to the state and therefore concluding that the umbrella 
clause had no direct application to this case); see also Hamester, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/24, ¶ 313 (“If the Tribunal finds that an act is not attributable to the State, this 
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This article does not aim to contribute further arguments to one side 
or the other of this dispute. Rather, it intends to examine whether the 
existing case law is really as contradictory as it appears or whether it can 
be reconciled by taking the underlying motives of the tribunals into 
account.14 As will be shown, the controversy in some of the more high-
profile cases only seemingly revolved around the question of the 
applicability of the ILC Articles and could have been avoided in the first 
place. Awareness that the real issue at stake may not necessarily be 
attribution under the ILC Articles can provide a way out of deadlock in 
some instances. 
II.  A RECENT EXAMPLE OF SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTING 
CASE LAW: HAMESTER AND KARDASSOPOULOS 
A recent example of seemingly contradictory case law is Hamester 
v. Ghana15 and Kardassopoulos v. Georgia.16 In Hamester, the tribunal 
held the joint-venture agreement (JVA) entered into by the Ghana Cocoa 
Board (Cocobod), a SOE, could not be attributed to Ghana by relying on 
the ILC Articles.17 Therefore, Ghana could not be held responsible for 
any breach of the JVA under the umbrella clause.18 In contrast, the 
tribunal in Kardassopoulos, concluded that contractual commitments 
entered into by two SOEs, SakNavtobi and Transneft, could be attributed 
to Georgia by applying the ILC Articles.19 
In Hamester, a request for arbitration was submitted against Ghana 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) on the basis of the BIT between Germany and Ghana.20 The 
claimant argued that Cocobod breached the JVA on the processing of 
cocoa beans and asserted that these breaches were attributable to 
Ghana.21 According to the claimant, the breaches of the JVA were 
elevated to breaches of the BIT through the umbrella clause in Article 
 
should be the end of the matter.”). 
 14. Such analysis appears to have first been conducted by Jean-Christophe Honlet 
and Gullaume Borg. See Jean-Christophe Honlet & Guillaume Borg, The Decision of the 
ICSID Ad Hoc Committee in CMS v. Argentina Regarding the Conditions of Application 
of an Umbrella Clause: SGS v. Philippines Revisited, 7 L. & PRAC. INT’L CT. & 
TRIBUNALS 1, 24–28 (2008) (examining contradictory decisions of tribunals and 
concluding “there may not be such a different approach . . . .”). The present article intends 
to further develop their theory. 
     15.   See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24. 
 16. See Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and 
ARB/07/15, Award (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/KardassopoulosAward.pdf. 
 17. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶¶ 342–50. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, ¶¶ 273–80. 
 20. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶ 1. 
 21. Id. ¶ 7. 
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9(2)22 of the BIT.23 Ghana countered that the umbrella clause would not 
cover contractual obligations, and even if it did, it could only apply to 
contracts entered into by Ghana, not SOEs with a separate legal 
personality.24  
The tribunal conducted an in-depth analysis as to whether 
Cocobod’s conduct could be attributed to Ghana under the ILC Articles 
and concluded that the preconditions of Articles 4, 5 or 8 of the ILC 
Articles were not met.25 The tribunal explained that once it was decided 
that the act complained of was not attributable to the state, there was no 
need to determine whether this conduct was in breach of an international 
obligation of the state.26 Nevertheless, in light of the parties’ detailed 
submissions, the tribunal decided to expand its analysis based on the 
assumption that the acts were—contrary to the tribunal’s conclusion—
attributable to Ghana.27 
The tribunal therefore assessed whether the acts in question 
amounted to a breach of international law. In construing the breach of the 
umbrella clause, the tribunal first acknowledged that there were divergent 
decisions on the interpretation of the umbrella clause, “including the 
approach to the international law rules of attribution in this context.”28 
The tribunal quickly made clear that it shared the view that contracts 
concluded between the investor and legal entities separate from the state 
would not fall within the scope of the umbrella clause.29 The tribunal 
pointed out that the JVA was signed by the claimant and Cocobod, not by 
Ghana, and provided three reasons for its conclusion.30 
First, pursuant to the wording of the umbrella clause, the contractual 
obligations that the claimant sought to impose on Ghana were not 
 
 22. The umbrella clause provided: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any other 
obligation it has assumed with regard to its investments in its territory by nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party.” Treaty between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Republic of Ghana for the encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investments, Ger.-Ghana, art. 9(2), Feb. 24, 1995, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dit 
e/iia/docs/bits/germany_ghana.gr.pdf. 
 23. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶¶ 1, 70, 75, 148–62. 
 24. Id. ¶¶ 83, 340 (citing Respondent’s Counter-Memorial, ¶ 311). 
 25. Id. ¶¶ 182–285. Articles 4, 5, and 8 of the ILC Articles each set forth a basis for 
attribution to the state. Article 4 refers to state organs, article 5 to conduct of persons or 
entities exercising elements of governmental authority, and article 8 to conduct directed or 
controlled by the state. See Gallus, supra note 7, at 165. 
 26. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶ 313. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. ¶ 343. 
 29. See id. The Tribunal cited with approval Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 223 (Apr. 22, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 245 (2007) 
(“[C]ontracts concluded between an investor and a legal entity separate from the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan did not fall within the scope of the umbrella clause.”).  
 30. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶ 347. 
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“assumed by it.”31 “Given that the umbrella clause in this BIT is 
specifically delimited by reference to obligations that have been 
“assumed by the State,” the tribunal saw no basis to ignore these words, 
and to extend the ambit of the provision to contractual obligations 
assumed by other separate entities.”32 
Second, given the wording of Article 9(2), the tribunal concluded 
that the contracting states, Germany and Ghana, did not intend to 
“transform the nature, extent and governing law of domestic law 
contractual obligations concluded by separate entities.”33 
Third, the tribunal explained that it was “aware that some tribunals 
extended the ambit of ‘umbrella clauses’ to contracts concluded by 
separate entities, by reference to the international law principles of 
attribution.”34 The tribunal held: “even if the international law principles 
of attribution are applicable in construing the ambit of Article 9(2) of the 
BIT here, it was clear that Cocobod’s act of concluding the JVA was not 
attributable” to Ghana under the ILC Articles.35 
The tribunal explained that in these circumstances, the contractual 
commitments of Cocobod, being a separate entity from the state, could 
not be considered as elevated by Article 9(2), into treaty commitments of 
the state itself.36 Thus a violation committed by Cocobod could not 
constitute a violation of the BIT.37 
In Kardassopoulos, the tribunal favored another approach. 
Kardassopoulos was an ICSID arbitration brought under the Energy 
Charter Treaty and the BITs between Georgia and Greece and Georgia 
and Israel, dealing with an investment in the development of oil 
pipelines.38 In this case, the tribunal did not have to assess the breach of 
the umbrella clause, but it dealt in another context with the question of 
whether Georgia was bound by the contractual commitments of two 
SOEs, SakNavtobi and Transneft.39 
Georgia rejected claims of unlawful expropriation and breach of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard by arguing it was not responsible 
for the contractual commitments of SakNavtobi and Transneft.40 The 
tribunal held that Georgia was bound by the contractual commitments of 
 
 31. See id. ¶ 347i. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. ¶ 347ii. 
 34. See id. ¶ 347iii. 
 35. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24. 
 36. See id. ¶ 348. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and 
ARB/07/15, Award, ¶¶ 1–2 (Mar. 3, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Kardassopoulo 
sAward.pdf. 
 39. The claimants abandoned this claim in their Reply. See id. ¶ 212. 
 40. See id. ¶ 272. 
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SakNavtobi and Transneft by way of attribution pursuant to the ILC 
Articles.41 Further, the conduct of SakNavtobi and Transneft could be 
attributed to Georgia under Articles 4, 5 and 11 of the ILC Articles, an 
opposite conclusion from Hamester.42 It noted that “[w]hen considered 
together, the representation by SakNavtobi and Transneft and the various 
espousals by the Georgian Government of the JVA and the Deed of 
Concession are conclusive”43 and concluded that “for the purpose of 
determining a breach of the applicable treaties, any acts or omissions of 
SakNavtobi and/or Transneft constituting such breach may be attributed 
to the Respondent.”44 
These recent awards reflect the conflicting views on the question of 
attribution. While the tribunal in Hamester denied that contractual 
undertakings could be attributed to the state under the ILC Articles, the 
tribunal in Kardassopoulos concluded otherwise. These resulting 
discrepancies between tribunals fail to provide adequate guidance on how 
to assess attribution by similarly acting SOEs. 
III.  THE QUESTION IN DISPUTE: CAN CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS BE ATTRIBUTED UNDER THE ILC ARTICLES? 
Hamester and Kardassopoulos are just two recent examples of an 
ongoing dispute. Tribunals and commentators alike are split over the 
question of whether the legal undertaking assumed by the SOE can be 
attributed to the state under the ILC Articles.45 Only if the contractual 
obligations are attributable to the state, it is argued, can the subsequent 
breach be meaningfully attributed: 
It must be noted that there are two points in time at which rules of attribution are 
important in applying obligations observance clauses to sub-state entity 
obligations. As with a claim for breach of any international obligation, rules of 
attribution can be applied to the act breaching the obligation. However, 
determining that the act breaching the obligation is attributable to the state is not 
the end of the matter. The act breaching the obligation is meaningless if the 
obligation is not that of the state. . . .It is the application of international rules of 
attribution at this first point in time – to determine the obligations of the state – 
which appears to have divided BIT tribunals.46 
 
 41. See id. ¶ 274 (“In the Tribunal’s opinion, there can be no real question in these 
arbitrations as to the attribution of any acts or omissions on the part of SakNavtobi or 
Transneft to the Respondent. The Tribunal invoked Article 7 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility in its Decision on Jurisdiction, but Articles 4, 5 and 11 are equally 
applicable here.”). 
 42. See id. ¶¶ 274–80. 
 43. See id. ¶ 279. 
 44. See id. ¶ 280. 
 45. See Gallus, supra note 7, at 166 (“The key difference in the reasoning of the two 
sets of decisions reaching conflicting conclusions on the attribution of sub-state entity 
contracts seems to be the role of international law rules of attribution, as reflected in the 
ILC Articles.”); see also Blyschak, supra note 1, at 612–13. 
 46. Gallus, supra note 7, at 166; see also Blyschak, supra note 1, at 610–11. 
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Some tribunals and legal writers reject the idea that legal 
undertakings assumed by the SOE are attributable to the state under the 
ILC Articles. They take the stance that the ILC Articles are not general 
rules of attribution and cannot be used to attribute conduct, which does 
not constitute a breach of an international obligation. This position is 
supported by the commentary to the ILC Articles as adopted by the ILC 
in 2001 (Commentary) which explains that “[t]he question of attribution 
of conduct to the State for the purposes of responsibility is to be 
distinguished from other international law processes by which particular 
organs are authorized to enter into commitments on behalf of the State”47 
and clarifies that “[s]uch rules have nothing to do with attribution for the 
purposes of State responsibility.”48 The Commentary continues: “the 
State’s responsibility is engaged by conduct incompatible with its 
international obligations”49 and makes clear that “[t]hus, the rules 
concerning attribution set out in this chapter are formulated for this 
particular purpose, and not for other purposes for which it may be 
necessary to define the State or its Government.”50 
Early comments during the drafting stage of the ILC Articles lend 
further support to the argument that these provisions were not intended to 
serve as general rules of attribution. A report from 1973 explains that: 
[a]ttaching to the State a manifestation of will which is valid, for example, in 
order to establish its participation in a treaty is, however, in no way identifiable 
with the operation which consists of attributing to the State particular conduct 
for the purpose of imputing to it an internationally wrongful act entailing 
international responsibility.51  
The report continues to point out the narrow meaning of the 
envisioned ILC Articles by arguing that: 
[i]t would be wrong to adopt the same criteria in these two cases and to propose 
an identical solution based on a general and common definition of ‘act of the 
State’. In the context of the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, the ‘act of the State’ has its own specific character and must be defined 
according to particular criteria.52 
In line with these comments, Malcolm D. Evans also underlines the 
difference between rules of representation on the one hand and 
attribution under the ILC Articles on the other. He explains that “[t]he 
rules of attribution specify the actors whose conduct may engage the 
responsibility of the State, generally or in specific circumstances”53 
 
 47. See Draft Articles, supra note 6, at 39. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Documents of the Twenty-Fifth Session Including the Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly, [1973] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 189, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.1.   
 52. Id. 
 53. See James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International 
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whereas he emphasizes that “[i]t should be stressed that the issue here is 
one of responsibility for conduct allegedly in breach of existing 
international obligations of the State”54 and “does not concern the 
question which officials can enter into those obligations in the first 
place.”55 
A clear stance against the attribution of legal undertakings by 
applying the ILC Articles is taken by Richard Happ: 
Contrary to a recently voiced opinion, it is not possible to attribute a contract 
concluded by a sub-division or state-entity to the state by using the rules on state 
responsibility. The rules of attribution have been developed in the context of 
attributing acts to the state in order to determine whether those acts are in breach 
of international law. They cannot be applied mutatis mutandis. A clear 
distinction exists between the responsibility of a state for the conduct of an entity 
that violates international law (e.g. a breach of treaty) and the responsibility of a 
State for the conduct of an entity that breaches a municipal law contract.56 
Other tribunals and commentators, however, attach a different 
meaning to the ILC Articles. They understand the ILC Articles to 
constitute general rules of attribution under which both wrongful and 
non-wrongful acts can be attributed to the state. While Andrew 
Newcombe and Lluís Paradell acknowledge that “[i]t may be argued that 
these rules have been developed in the context of attributing 
responsibility for international law breaches and are not transposable to 
attributing the undertaking (the contract), i.e., the legal obligation, to the 
state”57 they counter that “the language and approach of the ILC’s 
Articles on State Responsibility and commentaries seem to suggest that 
they refer to attribution of conduct generally.”58 
Thomas W. Wälde also shares the view that, as a general matter, 
contractual undertakings can be attributed to the state, explaining that 
“[i]f a State enterprise . . . has entered into a contract, and if this contract, 
or rather contractual relationship, can be attributed, from entry to the end, 
to the State, then the State has entered into a commitment and is obliged 
to respect it.”59 
That the ILC Articles, or at least Article 4, constitute general rules 
of attribution and were therefore also applicable to conduct that would 
not constitute a wrongful act was upheld in Siag v. Egypt. The tribunal 
expressly followed the claimant’s argument that “Article 4 was a general 
 
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 451, 460 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Richard Happ, The Nykomb Case in the Light of Recent ICSID Jurisprudence, in 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 324 (Clarisse Ribeiro 
ed., 2006). 
 57. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 461 n.133 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Wälde, supra note 1, at 397. 
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principle of international law, which was not limited to the wrongful acts 
of a state organ”60 and therefore concluded that “the non-wrongful acts of 
Egypt’s judiciary are the acts of the Egyptian State.”61  
Kaj Hobér explains that if the ILC Articles are not applied to 
attribute contractual undertakings, “it would seem that this would allow 
states to do precisely what the rules of state responsibility were intended 
to prevent, namely to avoid responsibility by delegating responsibilities, 
to allow states to ‘contract out’ of state responsibility.”62 
As this collection of authorities shows, two camps exist whose 
views appear irreconcilable. If the ILC Articles are regarded as general 
rules of attribution, both the legal undertaking assumed by the SOE and 
its subsequent breach will be attributed to the host state if the 
preconditions of Articles 4, 5 or 8 of the ILC Articles are met.63 If the 
ILC Articles are only applied to conduct that potentially constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation, the legal undertaking is not 
attributable. As explained above, it is generally considered that the 
breach of contract alone cannot be meaningfully attributed because only 
a party to a contract can commit a breach.64   
IV.  IS THERE A WAY OUT OF THE DEADLOCK? 
Honlet and Borg suggest that the discrepancy between the two 
camps “may be more apparent than real.”65 Based on an analysis of 
Eureko v. Poland66 and Noble Ventures v. Romania67, the authors 
conclude that despite appearances, the states were held to be obliged by 
the legal undertaking because at the conclusion of the contract, they were 
 
 60. See Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 194 
(June 1, 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/WaguihElieGeorgeSiag-
AwardandDissentingOpinion_001.pdf. 
 61. See id. ¶¶ 194–95 (The tribunal based its argument on a comment by Dolzer & 
Schreuer to Article 7 of the ILC Articles: “The Tribunal prefers the arguments of the 
Claimants on this issue. In taking that view, the Tribunal notes the provisions of Article 7 
of the ILC Articles, which states that: ‘The conduct of an organ of a State…shall be 
considered an act of the State under international law . . . even if it exceeds its authority’ 
[emphasis added]. Dolzer and Schreuer state that under Article 4 of the ILC Articles, 
‘[a]cts of a state's organs will be attributed to that state even if they are contrary to law…’ 
[emphasis added]. The clear corollary of that statement is that acts of a State's organs that 
are not contrary to law or in excess of authority will be applied a fortiori to the State.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 62. Hobér, supra note 4, at 575. 
 63. See Gallus, supra note 7, at 165. 
 64. See id. at 166. 
 65. See Honlet & Borg, supra note 14, at 24 (footnote omitted). 
 66. See Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion 
(Rajski), (Aug. 19, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 331 (2007). 
 67. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, (Oct. 
12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf. 
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represented by the state treasury and a SOE, respectively.68 Thus, they 
explain, the states were considered to be responsible because of ab initio 
representation rather than post hoc attribution.69 
Honlet and Borg rightly suggest that when examining the apparently 
contradictory case law, it is worthwhile to look beyond the surface and to 
switch the focus from the apparent decisive point, namely attribution, to 
the potentially actual point, namely the parties to the contract. In several 
instances the role played by the state at the conclusion of the contract 
appeared to be a decisive factor when tribunals assessed the question of 
whether or not the contractual obligation entered into by the SOE could 
be attributed to the state. 
It is possible to reconsider Kardassopoulos and examine the 
tribunal’s considerations in light of Honlet and Borg’s observations. In its 
award, the tribunal repeatedly emphasized the involvement of the 
government of Georgia in the negotiations: 
The assurances given to Claimant regarding the validity of the JVA and the 
Concession were endorsed by the Government itself, and some of the most 
senior Government officials of Georgia (including, inter alia, President 
Gamsakhurdia, President Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Sigua and Prime 
Minister Gugushvili) were closely involved in the negotiation of the JVA and the 
Concession. The Tribunal also notes that the Concession was signed and 
“ratified” by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, an organ of the Republic of 
Georgia.70 
. . . . 
The reasoning in Southern Pacific Properties is apposite to this case in many 
respects. Thus, even if the JVA and the Concession were entered into in breach 
of Georgian law, the fact remains that these two agreements were ‘cloaked with 
the mantle of Governmental authority’. Claimant had every reason to believe 
that these agreements were in accordance with Georgian law, not only because 
they were entered into by Georgian State-owned entities, but also because their 
content was approved by Georgian Government officials without objection as to 
their legality on the part of Georgia for many years thereafter.71 
While the tribunal formally based its argument that Georgia was 
bound by the contracts concluded by the state entities on the ILC 
Articles, these passages suggest that the tribunal was influenced in its 
decision to hold the host state responsible by the host state’s strong 
involvement in the conclusion of the agreements. The tribunal argued 
that the agreements were “cloaked with the mantle of Governmental 
authority”;72 this can be construed to mean that the SOEs acted on behalf 
of Georgia, or that Georgia entered into the agreement as an additional 
 
 68. See Honlet & Borg, supra note 14, at 27. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB 
07/15, Award, ¶ 273 (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/KardassopoulosAward.pdf (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. See id. 
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party. 
In EnCana v. Ecuador, the considerations provided by the tribunal 
also suggest that its finding of attribution was based on the contractual 
undertakings assumed by the SOE Petroecuador to Ecuador because of 
the state’s involvement during the conclusion and performance of the 
contract.73 It is interesting to note in this context that the domestic law of 
Ecuador defined agreements of the type concluded as “entered into by the 
State, through PETROECUADOR”.74 When dealing with the question of 
whether Ecuador was responsible for the obligations entered into by the 
SOE, the tribunal did not expressly, however, base its conclusion on the 
argument that Ecuador was represented by Petroecuador but rather relied 
on Article 5 and 8 of the ILC Articles.  
In Noble Ventures, representation rather than attribution was even 
more manifestly the actual reason for considering the state bound by the 
obligations assumed by the SOE. When assessing whether the conduct of 
the entities SOF and APAPS could be attributed to Romania under 
Article 5 of the ILC Articles,75 the tribunal reviewed the statutory bases 
under Romanian law of these entities and concluded that they were 
authorized to act on behalf of the state: 
Consequently, the Tribunal concludes that SOF and APAPS were entitled by law 
to represent the Respondent and did so in all of their actions as well as 
omissions. The acts allegedly in violation of the BIT are therefore attributable to 
the Respondent for the purposes of assessment under the BIT.76 
. . . . 
Both SOF and APAPS were responsible, as a matter of Romanian law, for the 
transfer of publicly owned assets to private investors. Both entities were clearly 
charged with representing the Respondent in the process of privatizing State-
owned companies and, for that purpose, entering into privatization agreements 
 
 73. See EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award, ¶ 
154 (Feb. 3, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/EncanaAwardEnglish.pdf (“The 
Respondent did not deny that entering into Participation Contracts with foreign companies 
to exploit the natural resources of Ecuador, the conduct of Petroecuador as a State-owned 
and State-controlled instrumentality is attributable to Ecuador for the purposes of the BIT. 
In this respect it is relevant that Petroecuador was, in common with the SRI, subject to 
instructions from the President and others, and that the Attorney-General pursuant to the 
law had and exercised authority ‘to supervise the performance of . . . contracts and to 
propose or adopt for this purpose the judicial actions necessary for the defence of the 
national assets and public interest’. According to the evidence this power extended to 
supervision and control of Petroecuador’s performance of the participation contracts and to 
their potential renegotiation. Thus the conduct of Petroecuador in entering into, performing 
and renegotiating the participation contracts (or declining to do so) is attributable to 
Ecuador. It does not matter for this purpose whether this result flows from the principle 
stated in Article 5 of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts or that stated in Article 8. The result is the same.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 74. See id. ¶ 26 (citation omitted). 
 75. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 70 
(Oct. 12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf. 
 76. Id. ¶ 80 (emphasis added). 
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and related contracts on behalf of the Respondent. Therefore, this Tribunal 
cannot do otherwise than conclude that the respective contracts, in particular the 
SPA, were concluded on behalf of the Respondent and are therefore attributable 
to the Respondent for the purposes of Art. II(2)(c)BIT.77 
The tribunal expressly held that these entities represented Romania 
in the negotiations and concluded the contract on behalf of the state. 
The tribunal in LESI-Dipenta v. Algeria relied on a similar argument 
when explaining that the contract concluded with a separate legal entity 
may be attributed to the state where the state was at least indirectly 
involved in the contract negotiation and exercised influence over the 
entity.78 
In contrast, tribunals that argued that the contractual undertaking 
could not be attributed to the state emphasized the distinction between 
the entity concluding the agreement and the state. In Hamester, the 
tribunal explained: 
The JVA was signed by Hamester and Cocobod, with no implication of the ROG 
[Republic of Ghana].  The ROG was not named as a party, and did not sign the 
contract. There has been no suggestion that the ROG was intended to be a party 
thereto (and indeed there may well have been reasons why it was not a party 
thereto).79 
The tribunal stressed that Ghana was by no means involved in the 
conclusion of the contract. Therefore, the tribunal expressed its belief 
that Ghana did not cause the claimant to believe that Ghana intended to 
become a party to this agreement. Thus, even under the assumption that 
the SOE’s conduct could be attributed to Ghana,80 the tribunal refused to 
consider Ghana bound by the contract because it was clear under the 
circumstances that Ghana did not intend to become a party. 
In Nagel v. Czech Republic,81 the claimant inter alia argued that the 
Czech Republic breached the umbrella clause contained in the BIT 
between the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic because of the 
failure of a SOE to meet its obligation to involve the claimant in any 
telecommunications license awarded to the entity.82 The tribunal rejected 
this claim on the grounds that the contract was entered into by the SOE 
and not the Czech Republic: 
 
 77. Id. ¶ 86 (emphasis added). 
 78. See Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPENTA v. People’s Democratic Republic of 
Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award, § II, ¶ 19 (ii) (Jan. 10, 2005), 15 ICSID Rep. 
3 (2010). 
 79. Gustav F.W. Hamester GmbH & Co. KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 347 (June 18, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf (emphasis added). 
 80. See id. ¶ 313. 
 81. See Nagel v. Czech Republic, Case No. 49/2002, Award, (Arb. Inst. of the 
Stockholm Comm. 2003), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Nagel_v_CzechRep_Award.pdf. 
 82. See id. ¶¶ 72–76, 91. 
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While Sra—subsequently succeeded by CRa—was a party to the Cooperation 
Agreement, the Czech Republic was not. Although Sra was a fully owned State 
enterprise, it was a separate legal person whose legal undertakings did not as 
such engage the responsibility of the Czech Republic. 
. . . . 
The Arbitral Tribunal notes that Mr Nagel’s accounts of frequent and close 
contacts with persons on the Government side differ a great deal from Mr 
Dyba’s and Mr Sedlacek’s statements that they were neither involved in nor 
informed about Mr Nagel’s and Millicom’s action and plans in the Czech 
Republic. However, the Arbitral Tribunal does not find it necessary, for the 
purpose of this case, to go into details in this regard but finds it sufficient to note 
that, in any event, there is no convincing evidence of such concrete Government 
involvement in connection with the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement as 
would make the Czech Republic responsible for the implementation of the 
Agreement. Moreover, as explained to the Arbitral Tribunal, Government 
approval or any other binding commitment by the Government would have had 
to be made in a form which was certainly not applied in this case, and Mr Nagel 
cannot have been justified in believing that, as a result of the Cooperation 
Agreement, the Government had made any commitment or undertaken any legal 
obligations towards him.83 
This analysis provides particular insight if contrasted with the 
involvement of the Georgian government in Kardassopoulos. As noted, 
in Kardassopoulos the tribunal pointed out that “[t]he assurances given to 
Claimant regarding the validity of the JVA and the Concession were 
endorsed by the Government itself”84 and that “some of the most senior 
Government officials of Georgia . . . were closely involved in the 
negotiation of the JVA and the Concession.”85 Considering these 
differences, it is not surprising that the tribunals arrived at opposite 
conclusions as to the question of whether the host state was bound by the 
contract.  
Finally, some tribunals emphasize the parties that are involved at the 
close of contract negotiations. While Impregilo v. Pakistan86 did not 
address the investor’s justifiable expectations in such clear terms as was 
the case in Nagel, the lack of such expectation can be read into the 
tribunal’s repeated emphasis that the relevant “[c]ontracts were 
concluded with WAPDA and not with the State of Pakistan”87 and that 
“the [c]ontracts at issue were concluded between the Claimant and 
WAPDA”.88 
In the cited cases, the extent to which the host state was involved in 
 
 83. Id. ¶ 321, 324 (emphasis added). 
 84. See Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and 
ARB 07/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 191 (July 6, 2007), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Kardassopoulos_000.pdf (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Apr. 22, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 245 (2007). 
 87. See id. ¶¶ 198, 216. 
 88. See id. ¶ 216.  
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the negotiations appears to have played a decisive role in the tribunal’s 
examination of whether or not the legal undertaking in question could be 
attributed to the state. However, it would be more convincing to take into 
account the state’s involvement in the negotiations at an earlier stage, 
namely when the parties to the agreement are determined. If the state’s 
participation in the conclusion of the agreement leads to the result that 
the state has become a party to the contract and assumed the obligations 
subsequently breached, attribution is no longer required and thus there is 
no need to engage in the discussion of whether the ILC Articles can be 
used to attribute legal undertakings. 
Two scenarios can be distinguished when assessing whether the 
state has become a party to the agreement. First, the involvement of the 
state causes the investor to reasonably and in good faith believe that the 
SOE represented the state at the conclusion of the agreement. In this 
case, the state, and not the SOE, has become the obligor of the 
contractual duties. Because the SOE acts as a representative of the state 
when performing the contract, the state is responsible for any subsequent 
breach under the umbrella clause based on principles of agency and not 
attribution. Second, the involvement of the state causes the investor to 
reasonably and in good faith believe that the state intended to become a 
party to the agreement along with the SOE. In this case, it must be 
determined which obligations have been assumed by the state. If the state 
was heavily involved in the negotiation phase, as was apparently the case 
in Kardassopoulos,89 it can be argued that the investor could reasonably 
understand that the state jointly and severally assumed the same 
obligations as the SOE.90 In such a case, the failure to perform by the 
SOE would also constitute a failure of the state, and no attribution would 
be required. Only if an analysis of the parties’ intent shows that the state 
did not assume the subsequently breached obligation, does the question 
arise whether this legal undertaking can be attributed to the state based 
on the ILC Articles. 
The question of whether the state has become a party to the contract 
can be assessed by applying general principles of law.91 Whether the 
SOE negotiated “cloaked with the mantle of Governmental authority” 
can be determined by applying the doctrine of apparent authority as 
formulated in several transnational codifications, such as Article 14(2) of 
the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods,92 Article 
 
 89. See id. ¶ 273. 
 90. See id. ¶ 280 (“For the purpose of determining a breach of the applicable treaties, 
any acts or omissions of SakNavtobi and/or Transneft constituting such breach may be 
attributed to the Respondent.”). 
 91. For the relevance of general principles of law in investment arbitration, see 
generally Tarcisio Gazzini, General Principles of Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 
10 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 103, 103–19 (2009). 
 92. See Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods art. 14 ¶ 2, Feb. 17, 
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2.2.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts 2010,93 and Article 3:201 of the Principles of European 
Contract Law.94 All these provisions share the same underlying idea: The 
principal shall be bound by an agreement entered into by the agent and 
the third party if the principal’s conduct causes the third party reasonably 
and in good faith to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf 
of the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that 
authority.95 
Whether the state by its involvement expressed its intention to 
become a party along with the SOE can also be assessed by applying the 
principle of implied consent as formulated in Article 2.1.1 of the of the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 201096 or 
Article 2:102 of the Principles of European Contract Law.97 These 
provisions appear to reflect a generally acknowledged principle, as noted 
by Gary B. Born “[m]ost legal systems recognize that a party’s assent to 
contractual terms may be established by conduct.”98  
Inspiration can also be taken from the discussion on commercial 
arbitration regarding the legal bases for subjecting non-signatories to the 
arbitration agreement. When addressing the question of which legal 
principle the joinder of “less-than-obvious parties” shall be determined, 
William W. Park explains: 
 
1983, 22 I.L.M. 249 (“Nevertheless, where the conduct of the principal causes the third 
party reasonably and in good faith to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf of 
the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that authority, the principal 
may not invoke against the third party the lack of authority of the agent.”). 
 93. See UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 82 
(Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private L., 2d ed. 2010) (“However, where the principal 
causes the third party reasonably to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf of 
the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that authority, the principal 
may not invoke against the third party the lack of authority of the agent.”). 
 94. See THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II, at 201 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) (“A person 
is to be treated as having granted authority to an apparent agent if the person’s statements 
or conduct induce the third party reasonably and in good faith to believe that the apparent 
agent has been granted authority for the act performed by it.”). 
 95. See also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
VOLUME I 1150 (2009) (“There are few principled grounds for choosing among these 
options, providing the basis for a substantial argument that, where international 
commercial contracts are concerned, a specialized rule of international law governing 
apparent authority should apply.”). 
 96. See UNIDROIT, supra note 93, at 34 (“A contract may be concluded either by 
the acceptance of an offer or by conduct of the parties that is sufficient to show 
agreement.”). 
 97. See THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 94, at 143 (“The 
intention of a party to be legally bound by contract is to be determined from the party's 
statements or conduct as they were reasonably understood by the other party.”). 
 98. See BORN, supra note 95, at 666 (containing numerous references); see also id. at 
1150. 
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Arbitral jurisdiction based on implied consent involves a non-signatory that 
should reasonably expect to be bound by (or benefit from) an arbitration 
agreement signed by someone else, perhaps a related party. In such 
circumstances, no unfairness results when arbitration rights and duties are 
inferred from behaviour. 
. . . . 
Implied consent focuses on the parties’ true intentions. Building on assumptions 
that permeate most contract law, joinder extends the basic paradigm of mutual 
assent to situations in which the agreement shows itself in behavior rather than 
words.99 
A related concept is the principle of deemed consent: 
Properly understood, ‘deemed consent’ operates simply as a way to objectify 
assent for fact patterns where an agreement exists, notwithstanding that 
traditional formalities may be absent or unclear. The circumstances of the 
parties’ relationship will be seen as ‘tantamount’ to an agreement (perhaps a 
‘backdoor’ contract) even if the conduct does not fit squarely within the contours 
of classic contract doctrine.100 
Park notes, however, that this doctrine “should never replace clear-
minded analysis of who agreed to what.”101 Reliance on deemed consent 
is only appropriate where “the parties’ reasonable expectations require 
that arbitration be imposed by virtue of facts which in fairness must be 
assimilated to consent.”102  
Relying on non-domestic principles to determine the parties to an 
agreement is not uncommon in commercial arbitration. Gary B. Born 
observes that “[a] number of arbitral awards have applied principles of 
international law to ascertain the parties to an international arbitration 
agreement.”103  
Obviously, the scope of the principle of implied or deemed consent 
is not limited to a determination of the parties to an arbitration 
agreement; rather, these principles are generally applicable to such a 
determination.104 
 
 99. William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s 
Dilemma, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 1.12 
(Belinda McMahon ed., 2009); see also NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER 
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 2.52 (5th ed. 2009) (“As between the original parties 
to the arbitration agreement, such consent may be either express, implied, or by reference 
to a particular set of arbitration rules . . . .”); W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 177 (3d ed. 2000) (“The 
addition as respondents of non-signatory parties, parent corporations, or members of a 
group of companies, is justified only where there are special circumstances (including 
participation in the performance of the contract) from which  a contractual intention to 
include them within the scope of the arbitration clause can be implied.”). 
 100. Park, supra note 99, ¶ 1.45. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. ¶ 1.47. 
 103. See BORN, supra note 95, at 1212 (containing numerous references). 
 104. See THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 94, at 143; 
UNIDROIT, supra note 93. 
38 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  
 
Finally, it should be clarified that the purpose of this article is not to 
provide yet another basis to hold host states responsible. Rather, by 
assessing whether the state has become a party can be advantageous to 
the state. For instance, if proper analysis shows that in light of all 
relevant circumstances the investor could not have reasonably assumed 
that the state had become a party, the risk is reduced that the tribunal will 
take the state’s conduct inappropriately into account when dealing with 
attribution. The involvement of the state during the negotiation phase 
plays an incidental role under the ILC Articles, which focus chiefly on 
the attribution of wrongful acts.105 The involvement of the state during 
the negotiation phase plays an incidental role. It may primarily be of 
relevance under Article 8 of the ILC Articles. If determination of the 
parties to an agreement and attribution under the ILC Articles is strictly 
separated, a more convincing result can be achieved.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Analysis shows that in some instances, the tribunal’s decision as to 
whether a subsequently breached contractual undertaking can be 
attributed to the host state appears to be influenced by the involvement of 
the host state in the conclusion of the contract. However, such 
involvement is already and primarily relevant when determining the 
parties to the agreement. The state may be considered to be a party of the 
agreement if its involvement caused the investor reasonably to believe 
that it intended to become a party to the agreement. Such assessment 
could be conducted based on the generally acknowledged principles of 
apparent authority, implied consent or deemed consent. 
If a proper assessment of the parties’ expectations at the conclusion 
of the contract leads to the result that the state had become a party to the 
agreement, the hotly debated question of whether contractual obligations 
are attributable under the ILC Articles can be avoided. However, if an 
examination shows that the investor could not have reasonably assumed 
that the state has become a party, a focused analysis can be conducted as 
to whether the preconditions of the ILC Articles are met.  In such 




 105. See, e.g., Gallus, supra note 7, at 166 (illustrating that primarily international law 
rules of attribution are traditionally applied to acts breaching an international law 
obligation). 
